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CONTROLLING DISCRETIONARY POWER IN
PRISON ORGANIZATIONS: A REVIEW
OF THE MODEL ACT
JAMES A. JABLONSKI*
A Model Act for the Protection of Rights of Prisoners1 (Model Act)
is designed to establish law where presently there is little. Many states
have only scanty prison legislation, limited to ensuring that prison ad-
ministrators provide food, clothing, and medical care for prisoners.2
For the most part, legislators have, by inaction, conceded virtually un-
limited discretion to prison personnel to establish policies and make
decisions. Judicial law-making has been similarly sparse; courts
have been unwilling and, until recently, unasked to establish law which
would affect the administration of prisons. Consequently, there is little
formal law imposed from without prisons that controls what is done
within. And prison administrators, by and large, have not estab-
lished effective internal controls, although there has been some
movement in this direction. 3  As a result of these failures decision-
makers, including lower-level staff, within prison organizations have
an abundance of unregulated discretionary power. Law has been
abandoned, in effect, in an area where it is greatly needed.4 Legisla-
tion is an essential first step in gaining control, but by itself cannot be
fully effective in accomplishing that important objective.
* Assistant Professor of Law and Social Work, Washington University. B.B.A.,
1965, JD., 1968, University of Wisconsin.
1. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, A MODEL ACT FOR THE
PROTECTION OF RIGHTs OF PRISONERS (1972) [hereinafter cited as MODEL ACT].
2. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 45, § 45, 125 (1959); CAL. PENAL CODE § 2084 (Deer-
ing 1961); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 221.040, 221.120, 221.320 (1969). But see Illinois
Unified Code of Corrections, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1001-1-1 to 1008-6-1 (Smith-
Hurd 1973).
3. This movement is exemplified by the issuance of "Policy Statements" by the
United States Bureau of Prisons. The Statements are issued by the Washington office
of the Bureau in the name of the Director and are binding on all federal institutions.
Local institutions may promulgate additional policy statements, consistent with the
Bureau's, which adapt policies to local circumstances.
4. See Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HAv. L. REv. 1097,
1102 (1952).
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I. AN APPROACH TO EVALUATING THE MODEL ACT
It has long been understood that legislation can and should limit
the decision-making authority of administrators. The doctrine that
power cannot be delegated to administrative agencies without meaning-
ful standards was one of the dominant themes of both judicial and
scholarly writing during the growth of the agencies." What has been
much less understood, at least until recently, is that legislation can ef-
fect only limited control over administrative decision-making. Profes-
sor Davis, in his recent work, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary In-
quiry,' has greatly increased our understanding of the nature and scope
of administrative action-and inaction-that is little influenced by legis-
lation. Agency decision-makers often possess extremely broad discre-
tion because the legislation which established the agency is worded so
broadly that it does not effectively limit conceivable choices. This
broad discretionary power can be harmful. The decision-maker fre-
quently has such unrestricted latitude that even obviously unwise choices
are open to him. Persons similarly situated may be treated unequally
for improper reasons. Further, the failure to develop principles an-
nounced in advance leaves those affected by the agency unable to gauge
what is required of them.
An apparent solution to this problem is enactment of more compre-
hensive and detailed legislation. The Model Act, of course, is intended
to encourage more legislative regulation of prison practices. But expe-
rience demonstrates that there are some rather sharp limitations on
the extent to which legislators are willing or able to control the actions
of an administrative agency by developing a detailed legislative scheme.
Even in those agencies which have received substantially more legis-
lative attention than prisons, much discretionary power remains in the
hands of the agencies." Davis suggests a number of reasons for this,
all of which are likely to have a bearing on any effort to control prison
organizations through legislation." First, legislators are not experts in
many areas and often wisely refrain, when establishing an agency, from
doing more than setting forth broad policy outlines. Secondly, some
5. See 1 K. DAVIs, ADMINiSTRA=ITW LW TAnsE § 2.01 et seq. (1958).
6. K. DAVIs, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969) [herein-
after cited as DAVIS]. For a discussion of some of Professor Davis' ideas, see Sym-
posium-Administrative Discretion, 37 LAw & CoNTEMp. PROB. 1 (1972).
7. See DAviS 70, 78.
8. Id. at 38-39.
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problems of policy may be beyond the capacity of even the experts, so
that it is better to develop more limited answers by focusing on con-
crete cases as they arise. Thirdly, some questions which should be
resolved by legislators are not, either because of poor draftsmanship,
or because an inability to agree leads to compromise which leaves the
matter to administrators. And lastly, it is, of course, desirable that
some discretionary power be granted so that the decision-maker has suf-
ficient latitude to take into account relevant factors in specific cases.
There is certainly no consensus about the objectives of prisons; dif-
fering views will always make it hard for legislators to reach agree-
ment concerning specific questions of policy. Even assuming a con-
sensus on objectives, there is a lack of knowledge among experts about
how these objectives can be accomplished.9 Often there is little justifica-
tion for establishing, at least in a form which is as permanent as legis-
lation, prison policies so detailed that they would substantially reduce
discretionary power. Some room is needed to experiment with various
approaches to determine which are sound. And, of course, much dis-
cretionary power is inevitably exercised in applying generally appli-
cable standards to specific cases.
All this is not to suggest that legislation is unimportant in limiting,
or "confining,"' 10 discretionary power which can adversely affect pris-
oners. Legislation can begin to confine discretion by drawing bound-
ary lines and keeping choices within them. In some instances, the lines
may be broadly drawn, consisting of little more than a statement of
general principles. In other instances, the lines may be drawn quite
narrowly, severely limiting administrative choices. The initial task for
the legislature is to determine just how much discretionary power it
wishes to delegate to prison organizations. The power should be
sufficiently broad to prevent injustice as a result of an administrator's
inability to take into account relevant considerations which are likely
to be apparent only when the matter arises. On the other hand, the
power should not be so broad as to facilitate arbitrariness or allow
the decision-maker to make a choice which the legislators can agree
9. See D. GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESs OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM (1964);
Cressey, The Nature and Effectiveness of Correctional Techniques, 23 LAw & CON-
TEmp. PROB. 754 (1958); Logan, Evaluation Research in Crime and Delinquency:
A Reappraisal, 63 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 378 (1972); Robison & Smith, The Effective-
ness of Correctional Programs, 17 CRWE & DELINQuENCY 67 (1971).
10. See DAVIS 55. I shall use Professor Davis' terminology.
Vol. 1973:563] 565
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they do not want. It is clear that even with considered and well-
drafted legislation, much discretionary power necessarily will be
granted to prison administrators. Legislative activity must be supple-
mented by other methods of control if excessive discretionary power is
to be avoided.
Professor Davis has given us a prescription for the further controlling
of discretionary power beyond that accomplished by legislation. Ad-
ministrative rules can do much the same thing as legislation and can
often be developed more effectively."1 Rules serve to limit the exer-
cise of discretionary power because, like legislation, they mark out the
area within which choices can be made, putting beyond reach certain
otherwise available courses of action. As with legislation, the degree
to which discretionary power is narrowed will depend upon the preci-
sion with which the rules are drafted. Prison administrators have not
done much to effectively confine the discretionary power granted to
them by the legislature. To the contrary, it has been observed that
"[prison] administrators, finding it difficult to harmonize treatment
and custody goals, have tended to generalize policy to such an extent
that subordinate staff are relatively free to decide many significant
questions of action and procedure."' 2  This practice results in leaving
difficult value choices to those at the lower end of the organizational
hierarchy-the persons least competent to make them.' 8
In spite of the admitted difficulty of harmonizing conflicting objec-
tives, administrators have sufficient familiarity with prison problems to
establish a detailed set of administrative rules. 14 Often, although the
legislature may wisely refrain from mandating a particular solution in
handling a given problem, it is nonetheless essential that some specific
rules be developed, lest administrative staff be left to make wholly un-
controlled decisions. The legislature, therefore, when it is unwilling
itself to provide detailed guidance, should at least require that admin-
istrators develop rules to govern the matter.'"
11. The term "rules" in this context includes policy statements, standards, and
regulations.
12. Lovell & Nelson, Correctional Management and Changing Goals of Correc-
tion, in PROBLEMS OF CRIMINAL JusncE ADMINISTRATION 82 (N. Cohn ed. 1969).
13. See G. KASSEBAum, D. WARD & D. WILNER, PRISON TREATMENT AND PAROLE
SURVIVAL: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT 10 (1971); Cressey, Contradictory Directives in
Complex Organizations: The Case of the Prison, 4 AD. Sci. Q. 1 (1959).
14. Caplan, The Case for Rulemaking by Law Enforcement Agencies, 36 LAW &
CONTRmI'. PROB. 500 (1971).
15. Prison administrators have issued rules (sometimes called "policy statements"
[Vol. 1973:563
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Both legislation and administrative rules, then, can serve to confine
discretionary power.' 6 It is significant, of course, that rules are de-
veloped by the administrators themselves, typically without partici-
pation by others, although that need not be the case.17  The increas-
ing intervention of courts in prison administration, and proposals for
legislation such as the Model Act, reflect a view that prisoners have been
denied basic human rights-that prison administrators have been
making, or at least permitting, decisions which place a greater value on
coercive methods of maintaining security and institutional order than on
the quality of the lives of their prisoners.
To the extent that there is a dissonance between the priorities of
administrators and of legislators (or perhaps more accurately, the pri-
orities of those drafting model legislation), the answer must be to enact
legislation which incorporates the priorities of legislators. Implicit in
granting discretionary power to administrators is an assumption that
any choice within the range of permitted alternatives is not contary
to legislative desires. If the legislature desires a particular change in
present practice, it must make its wish explicit.
It may be that legislators are not in substantial conflict with prison
administrators. The experience in Illinois suggests that they are not.
and thought of only as departmental directives) based either upon statutory authority,
see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 5058 (Deering 1961), or inherent authority. Courts
have sometimes required prison administrators to promulgate rules. See, e.g., Rhem v.
McGrath, 326 F. Supp. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Prison rules have been judicially re-
viewed on the assumption that they are authoritative expressions of government policy,
although the validity of this assumption is a complex question. See, e.g., McCarty v.
Woodson, 465 F.2d 822 (10th Cir. 1972); Wilson v. Prasse, 463 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.
1972). At the least, administrators are required to comply with their own rules until
such time as they are judicially invalidated. It is likely they would be given substantial
weight by the courts. In any event, it is clear that much more can be done to improve
the scope and quality of rulemaking without waiting for definitive judicial treatment
of prison administrative rules. See 1 K. DAvis, ADM1XISTRATVE LAW TREATISE
HI 5.01-.11, 6.01-.12 (1958); Caplan, supra note 14; McGowan, Rule-Making and the
Police, 70 MIcH. L. REv. 659, 684 (1972).
16. Whether such rules should or must be promulgated in accordance with the
various administrative procedure acts is not entirely clear. Compare American Friends
Serv. Comm. v. Procunier, 1 PRISoN L. REI,. 249 (Super. Ct. Sacramento, Cal. 1972),
rev'd, 33 Cal. App. 3d 252, 109 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1973), with Paolo v. Cupp, - Ore.
App. -, 500 P.2d 739 (1972).
17. The Boston University Center for Criminal Justice was consulted by the Mas-
sachusetts Department of Corrections to aid in developing administrative rules for that
system. The recommendations of the Center have been published as BosToN UNV-ER-
KEY CENTER FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, MODEL R..Es AND REGULATIONS ON PRISONERS'
RIOHTS AND RESPONSBLErms (1973).
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There, a legislative proposal developed by a largely independent group
of knowledgeable persons was altered in a number of sections, always
so as to grant greater discretionary power to prison administrators than
had been initially proposed.18 Here, as elsewhere, legislatures will fre-
quently choose to grant much latitude to agencies, so that administra-
tive rule-making will be an essential method of confining the power
granted.
Even with the establishment of legislation and administrative rules,
much discretion will remain in deciding concrete cases. Drawing
boundary lines can help clarify what the agency cannot do, but it is
of little help in determining the appropriate disposition among alter-
natives that are within the permissible scope of decision. It is essen-
tial to "structure"' 9 decision-making by establishing in advance those
factors which are relevant to the decision. The decision-maker is told
in effect that he may choose from available alternatives in dealing with
the problem at hand, but that he must first consider certain enunciated
factors. At first blush, structuring complex decisions seems a futile
task. But it has been done, even in dealing with a matter as difficult
as sentencing convicted persons; the Model Sentencing Act, 20 devel-
oped by the National Council on Crime -and Delinquency (NCCD)
and the American Law Institute (AL]), is an excellent example of what
can be done. The legislature can confine a judge's discretion by per-
mitting him to sentence an offender to a term of from two to twenty
years. In addition, it can tell him that in exercising that discretion
he must take into account those factors which the legislature deems
relevant. Discretion can be structured both by the legislature and by
prison administrators through careful articulation of those factors which
must be considered in reaching a decision.
How do we know whether the decision-maker has based his decision
on the requisite factors? We cannot, unless we require that he tell
us, preferably in writing, why he decided as he did. Requiring written
18. E.g., Illinois Unified Code of Corrections § 335-7 (Tent. Final Draft, 1971)
(minimum cell size); id. § 335-14 (telephone calls); id. § 335-15 (requiring that
person charging prisoner with disciplinary infraction be called at the hearing, and per-
mitting prisoner to call witnesses), were eliminated or altered when the law was en-
acted. Act of July 26, 1972, no. 77-2097, §§ 1-1-1, to 8-6-1, [1972] Ill. Laws Spec.
Sess. - (codified at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1001-1-1 to 1008-6-1 (Smith-Hurd
(1973)).
19. See DAvis 97-141.
20. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRmn AND DELINQUENCY, MODEL SENTENCING ACT
(2d ed. 1972).
[-Vol. 1973:563
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decisions discourages arbitrariness. And written decisions are even
more effective when they are open to inspection both by the affected
parties and staff members. Those affected are then able to point to
any error they see in the decision. The decision-makers will thus be
aware of the need to render decisions which are consistent with prior
practice. These practices can apply to specific kinds of decisions made
within prisons.
Confining discretionary power initially and then structuring that
which remains will go a long way in gaining control over the exercise
of authority in prisons. The essential last step is to ensure that ade-
quate checks are made so that we know there is compliance with the
established controls.2' Review of decisions reached by others helps
eliminate arbitrariness, both by altering it when it occurs, and by mak-
ing the decision-makers more conscious of the need to be fair.
Review of administrative decision-making can be accomplished in a
variety of ways. The primary method should be a provision for formal
or informal review by superior officers within the administrative hier-
archy. Superior officers, who are close to the decision-making proc-
ess, can best provide day-to-day review. Additional methods include
review by the courts and by other persons outside the prison sys-
tem. External review is important because review by superiors, espe-
cially in a prison hierarchy, is influenced by the need to maintain or-
ganizational relationships, a factor which may not always facilitate fair
and impartial review.
The Model Act can be judged, at least in part, by its success in
meeting these objectives. Examining its provisions in some detail will
help determine whether they adequately confine the discretion of prison
administrators. It is also important to determine the extent to which
the Model Act requires administrators to supplement legislative provi-
sions with administrative rules. It is not enough simply to grant dis-
cretionary power and hope it will be effectively controlled; it is not
even enough to specifically authorize rule-making. In a variety of in-
stances, the legislature ought to compel administrators to develop a
body of written rules adequate to confine, structure, and check discre-
tionary power.
Developing effective methods of protecting prisoners from unjust
treatment is not an easy task. It is not at all clear what kind of prison
21. See DAVIs 97-141.
Vol. 1973:563] 569
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regime produces the most beneficial results, either for society or for
the prisoners.22  The ultimate objective-reducing crime-remains to
be accomplished.23 Still, it is apparent that steps must be taken to
assert control over prison organizations. Legal scholarship can con-
tribute to this effort by gathering facts, analyzing and defining the issues,
and proposing some answers, both in the form of legislation 24 and ad-
ministrative rules. With these considerations in mind, let us turn
to the Model Act.
II. TE MODEL ACT
A. Central Principle
The Model Act establishes as its central principle the statement that
"[prisoners] shall retain all rights of an ordinary citizen, except those
expressly or by necessary implication taken by law."2  The draftsmen
adopted this principle from a judicial remark made in 1944,27 a time
when most courts were taking a much narrower view of prisoners'
rights. The purpose of the provision is to enable prison administrators
to impose restrictions or requirements only when necessary or desir-
able in achieving permitted objectives. Too often in the past ad-
ministrators have taken action, but when challenged were not required
to provide an adequate explanation."' The language of the Model
Act has the virtue of demanding at least some explanation.2 0
22. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
23. See N. MoRms & G. -JAwKiNs, THE HONEST POLMCIAN'S GUnP TO CRIME
CONTROL 111-44 (1970).
24. See Weehsler, Legal Scholarship and Criminal Law, 9 J. LEGAL ED. 18, 28
(1956).
25. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
26. MODEL ACr § 1 (a).
27. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S.
887 (1945).
28. See, e.g., Adams v. Pate, 445 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1971) (cells "inhumane, filthy
and foul"); Tabor v. Hardwick, 224 F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1955); United States ex
rel. Wagner v. Ragen, 213 F.2d 294 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 846 (1954);
Adams v. Ellis, 197 F.2d 483, 485 (5th Cir. 1952); Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 829 (1951); Rhinehart v. Rhay, 314 F. Supp. 81, 84
(W.D. Wash. 1970) (mail to attorney withheld); Prewitt v. Arizona ex rel. Eyman,
315 F. Supp. 793, 794 (D. Ariz.), affd, 418 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1054 (1970) (incoming mail denied); Green v. Maine, 113 F. Supp. 253 (D.
Me. 1953) (mail to and from attorney opened).
29. A variety of abuses has been recognized as justiciable. See, e.g., Edwards v.
Duncan, 355 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1966) (intentional deprivation of medical care);
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss3/4
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The principle is desirable not only because it serves to confine the
discretion of prison administrators within broad boundaries, but also
because it is flexible and capable of adaptation. Those restrictions
considered necessary today may some day be regarded as outmoded
convention. The Model Acts basic principle is suited to the period of
change we can anticipate, a period which may result in very different
kinds of institutions for confining people.
B. Basic Prisoner Needs
Immediately following the declaration of general principle, the Model
Act contains a detailed statement of certain minimal guarantees de-
signed to maintain prisoners' physical and mental health. The rights
to have adequate food, medical care, sanitation, ventilation, light, and
a generally healthful environment are spelled out.30 Regrettably, the
necessity for such provisions has been demonstrated by recent litiga-
tion. 1 Inadequate living conditions are particularly prevalent in local
facilities.3 2 Especially useful is the provision which requires "no less
Fulwood v. Clemmer, 295 F.2d 171 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (placement in solitary confine-
ment after complaining of treatment); Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 444 (6th
Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945) (subjection to assault, cruelty, and in-
dignity); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966) (placement in soli-
tary confinement under conditions of extreme deprivation); Talley v. Stephens, 247 F.
Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965) (forced field work when physically ill and infirm).
See also Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967), on remand, 321 F. Supp.
127 (N.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972); Howard v. Smyth, 365 F.2d 428 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 988 (1966); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio), supplemented,
330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), affd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854
(6th Cir. 1972); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), supplementing
300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969), aft'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
30. MODEL AcT § l(b).
31. E.g., Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1971); Sinclair v. Henderson,
435 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1970), on remand, 441 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D. La. 1971); Ford
v. Board of Managers, 407 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1969); Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519
(2d Cir. 1967), on remand, 321 F. Supp. 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1970), affd in part and
rev'd in part, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972); Landman v.
Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971), modified, 354 F. Supp. 1292 (E.D. Va.),
supplemented, 354 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Va. 1973); Hamilton v. Schiro, 338 F. Supp.
1016 (E.D. La. 1970), order issued sub nom. Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 549
(E.D. La. 1972); Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969); Jordan v.
Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
32. Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Jones v. Witten-
berg, 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio), supplemented, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971),
af 'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972); Hamilton v. Love,
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than fifty square feet of floor space in any confined sleeping area." 3
The provision is an example of the value of confining the discretion of
prison administrators severely when it is clear what is wanted. No
prison administrator can reasonably interpret this provision to permit a
cell which is smaller than the specified size.
The draftsmen did not include similar detail regarding the other health
requirements. Perhaps they could not say with precision what was
needed, preferring instead to leave that to administrators. When de-
tail is not included in the statute, administrative rules are essential to
spell out what is required. Rules can further specify, for example,
what constitutes nutritious food in adequate quantities. More than
enough is known about daily food requirements to have detailed spec-
ifications. The value of rules which detail daily food requirements is
at least threefold: they make concrete exactly what is required to im-
plement the statute; they aid in ensuring that staff members treat the
prisoners consistently; and they facilitate review of administrative com-
pliance with the statute. The legislature ought to demand that adminis-
trators promulgate rules concerning diet. Similarly, rules are essential
to implement adequately the statutory requirements concerning sanita-
tion, ventilation, light, and medical care.
This section also mandates "reasonable opportunities for physical
exercise and recreational activities. ' 34 Judicial law-making is unlikely
to provide for adequate exercise and recreation;r therefore, legisla-
tive establishment of these opportunities is especially desirable. Again,
the Model Act ought to require that prison administrators develop rules
spelling out the details of when and how these mandates are to be
met. Rules can help ensure that each prisoner in fact receives suffi-
cient time for exercise and recreation and has adequate access to fa-
cilities. Granting staff personnel the discretion to decide when and
for whom exercise will be allowed can easily result in failure to pro-
328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Johnson v. Lark, 1 PRISON L. REP. 225 (E.D. Mo.
1972); Wayne County Jail Inmates v. Wayne County Bd. Comm'rs, 1 PRISON L. REP.
51 (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich. 1971), supplemented, 1 PRISON L. REP. 186 (Cir.
Ct. Wayne County, Mich. 1972). See PREsiDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 73 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS]; Hawaiian Jail "Not Fit for
Human Habitation," Is Closed, 1 PRISON L. REP. 11 (1971).
33. MODEL ACT § 1 (b).
34. Id.
35. Courts have generally been reluctant to conclude that recreation is constitu-
tionally required. See, e.g., United States v. Wyandotte County, 343 F. Supp. 1189,
1211 (D. Kan. 1972).
[Vol. 1973:563
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vide adequate time for all and unequal treatment among those for
whom the opportunity is provided.
The most novel provisions of the Model Act are those which estab-
lish the right to "protection against any . . . psychological abuse or un-
necessary indignity," 0 and the prohibition against "any measure
intended to degrade the prisoner, including insults and verbal abuse."3
Imprisonment is inherently a degrading experience; descriptions of
prison life have demonstrated this dramatically.38 To live in a cage
with an open front into which all can see is degrading; to be stripped
naked and searched is degrading; to have one's personal letters opened,
read, and censored is degrading.30 It may be that this dimension of
prison life cannot be eradicated completely. Nonetheless, provisions
which attempt to do so are desirable. It has been thought, and still
may be, that a prison milieu which is degrading is not only unavoid-
able but desirable. The provisions of the Model Act make clear that
prison life is not to be made more degrading than it need be.
The discretion of prison administrators is confined only very broadly
by these provisions. The draftsmen were apparently unable to go much
beyond stating general principles. It is likely that they disagreed
among themselves whether certain prison practices are intentionally
degrading-for example, shearing hair, providing only spoons for eat-
ing, and calling prisoners by their first names while demanding that they
address the staff formally. Each draftsman was able to vote for the
general principle without having to come to grips with exactly what it
would do. Because of differences of opinion, that may be all that a
legislature would want to do at the moment. As knowledge about the
effectiveness of penal techniques grows, there will be increasing agree-
ment that some practices are more destructive than useful. For the
moment we can only ask that administrators be required continuously
to develop rules which recognize and prohibit practices which are de-
grading and no longer necessary. It is apparent that what may be
necessary in a system containing the most difficult prisoners is not
necessary in a juvenile facility. These differences can be recognized
and spelled out by local rule.
36. MODEL ACT § I(b).
37. Id. § 2(e).
38. See TASK FoRcE REPORT: CORcrONs 46.
39. See Singer, Privacy, Autonomy, and Dignity in the Prison: A Preliminary
Inquiry Concerning Constitutional Aspects of the Degradation Process in Our Prisons,
21 BUFFALO L. REv. 669 (1972).
Vol. 1973:563] 573
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Section 1 contains three additional subsections, each of which as-
serts a general principle. Section l(c) prohibits "inhumane treat-
ment," which is further defined in section 2. The draftsmen have
wisely spelled out those inhumane practices of which they were aware
and wanted to ban. The clauses in section 2 prohibiting physical
punishment and the use of force except to prevent assault, escape, or
riot are excellent, for they add some meat to the bare bones of prin-
ciple, thereby helping to make clear what is prohibited. Similarly,
the provisions prohibiting sexual assault and retaliatory punishment
further clarify what the draftsmen intended to proscribe.
C. First Amendment Rights
Section 2(f) prohibits discriminatory treatment based on race, re-
ligion, nationality, or political belief. A host of problems is encom-
passed in what appears to be a simple affirmation of fundamental prin-
ciple. The draftsmen have failed to deal adequately with these matters.
The general principle established is necessary and useful but it does not
go far enough. Additional general principles are necessary and greater
detail may be useful as well. Differences in race and religion,
and in political and social belief, give rise to many problems in the
prison setting.
1. Religion
Historically, religion of the conventional sort has been an integral
part of most prison communities:4" clergymen, typically a Catholic
and a Protestant, are employed by the state to conduct religious services
and otherwise serve in the prison; programs are conducted in addition
to regular services; a chapel and office are provided; and prisoners
are assigned to work in clergy offices. Little controversy was engen-
dered until a substantial number of prisoners became adherents of
less-accepted faiths, especially the Muslim faith.
Prison administrators typically took a dim view of Muslims and
imposed numerous restrictions upon their activities. Muslims sought,
sometimes successfully, to hold religious services, 41 to have spiritual
40. See AmEwcAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, MANuAL OF CORRECTIONAL STAND-
ADS 468 (3d ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as MAiuAL OF ConnmcnoNAL STANDARDS].
41. X. v. Willingham, 386 F.2d 153, 154 (10th Cir. 1967) (administrative regula-
tion formulated to permit meetings under specified conditions); Cooper v. Pate, 382
F.2d 518, 522 (7th Cir. 1967) (services must be permitted although they may be
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texts and literature, 2 and to be provided with a spiritual leader.43
The right of an individual Muslim to practice his religion in various
ways has usually been judicially settled by reference to the preroga-
tives enjoyed by other prisoners of more conventional religious belief,
a classic application of equal protection.44 Doubtlessly, additional
rights will be asserted, not only by Muslims but by prisoners claiming
adherence to other religions. The Model Act's provision is desirable
in that it establishes as a basic principle that discrimination based upon
religion is not to be tolerated. It is doubtful whether any additional
detail designed to prevent discrimination can profitably be included in
the Model Act itself. But the kinds of problems suggested by the liti-
gated cases are likely to crop up again and again. Much can be done
at the administrative level to ensure that all inmates have equal op-
portunity to have a place of worship, to attend services, to obtain re-
ligious literature, and to contact spiritual leaders. Administrative rules
can go further and ensure that the money spent by the state to support
religious activity within the prisons is spent equitably. Not every faith
can have a state-paid clergyman on a full-time basis, but an equi-
regulated); Lee v. Crouse, 284 F. Supp. 541, 548 (D. Kan. 1967), affd, 396 F.2d
952 (10th Cir. 1968) (congregation may be proscribed because of fear of racial
tension resulting from propagation of Muslim principles); Jones v. Willingham, 248
F. Supp. 791, 793-94 (D. Kan. 1965) (congregation banned); Banks v. Havener, 234
F. Supp. 27, 30 (E.D. Va. 1964) (inmates permitted to "practice their religion").
42. Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228, 1231 (4th Cir. 1971) (practice of religion
may be restricted only upon a convincing showing of paramount state interest); Walker
v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23, 28-29 (5th Cir. 1969) (inmates entitled to receive Moham-
med Speaks); Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816, 822 (3d Cir. 1968), modifying Long v.
Katzenbach, 258 F. Supp. 89 (M.D. Pa. 1966) (to justify the prohibition of religious
literature, prison officials must prove clear and present danger of a breach of prison
discipline or security or the orderly functioning of prison); Northern v. Nelson, 315
F. Supp. 687, 688 (N.D. Cal. 1970), affd, 448 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1971) (inmates
entitled to subscribe to Mohammed Speaks and institutions must be provided with at
least one copy of The Holy Qu-ran).
43. Northern v. Nelson, 315 F. Supp. 687, 688 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd, 448
F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1971) (Muslim minister, when available, shall be paid an hourly
rate comparable to Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish clergymen); Desmond v. Black-
well, 235 F. Supp. 246, 249 (M.D. Pa. 1964) (prisoner not permitted to correspond
with Elijah Muhammed).
44. Cooper v. Pate, 382 F.2d 518 (7th Cir. 1967); Pierce v. LaVallee, 293 F.2d
233 (2d Cir. 1961), on remand, 212 F. Supp. 865 (N.D.N.Y. 1962), arid per curiam,
319 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1963) (prisoners held in solitary confinement allegedly because
of religious beliefs); Northern v. Nelson, 315 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. Cal. 1970), affd, 448
F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1971); Banks v. Havener, 234 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Va. 1964);
State v. Cubbage, 58 Del. 430, 210 A.2d 555 (1965) (prisoner denied opportunity to
conduct services and to wear religious medals).
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table portion of the money available can be spent to compensate clergy
of smaller groups on an occasional basis. Further, money can be
apportioned in obtaining religious literature and other materials. Ad-
ministrative rules can be developed locally to deal with specific local
problems.
The non-discrimination provision is useful so far as it goes, but it
does not provide any affirmative protection for religious activity. Not
every religious practice has its parallel in other religions. Muslims
have asserted the right to be provided with the pork-free diet de-
manded by their religion.45  A Jewish inmate has asserted the right to
wear a beard, a religious requirement of his sect.40 In these instances
no discrimination argument can be made-the objection is that all
are being treated alike. But the free exercise clause of the first amend-
ment does not depend upon the beliefs and actions of others; each
man is permitted to pursue his own religious beliefs. And the Su-
preme Court has made it clear that the free exercise clause applies to
prisoners.47
Here, as elsewhere, the right to act, even in accord with one's re-
ligious convictions, is not without limit.40  Lower court decisions have
not articulated, in the prison context, a consistent delimiting standard.
The most protective would require the state to show a "compelling in-
terest to be furthered" with "only the gravest abuses, endangering par-
amount interests" 49 left unprotected. Another would give greater lati-
tude to administrators, requiring only that there be a "clear and pres-
ent danger to internal discipline ' 0 for prohibiting religious activity.
45. Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1969) (no special diet required);
Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (remanded to determine whether
state had compelling objectives which would not permit Muslims to observe dietary
laws and whether those objectives could be met by less restrictive means); Abernathy
v. Cunningham, 393 F.2d 775 (4th Cir. 1968) (no special diet necessary if nutrients
can be had without pork); Jackson v. Pate, 382 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1967) (warden
must recognize Black Muslim diet if other special religious diets are recognized);
Childs v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 932 (1964)
(no accommodation required).
46. Cf. People ex rel. Rockey v. Krueger, 62 Misc. 2d 135, 306 N.Y.S.2d 359
(Sup. Ct. 1969) (prison could require Muslim to shave beard although Jew may not be
required to shave).
47. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972).
48. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
49. Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
50. Abernathy v. Cunningham, 393 F.2d 775, 780 (4th Cir. 1968) (Craven, J.,
dissenting).
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Least restrictive of administrative discretion is a holding which requires
that the administrative action not be "arbitrary, capricious or unlaw-
ful." t
What kind of legislative provision would be most useful is not clear.
General standards along the lines of constitutional principles applied
by the courts in first amendment cases can confine discretion within
broad boundaries. A satisfactory legislative standard ought to recog-
nize that religious activity is entitled to some deference and should not
be prohibited simply because doing so furthers in some way a le-
gitimate state purpose. Only the most insignificant practice or the fee-
blest rule cannot be claimed to further some state purpose in some
way. Many rules which limit prisoner freedom to engage in first amend-
ment activities are imposed not because they are thought to be rehabili-
tative, but because they contribute to internal security or what might be
called "institutional survival." '  It is regrettable that because of the
nature of our prison organizations so much is sacrificed simply to pre-
vent escapes and protect staff from inmates and inmates from each
other. A task for the future is to develop effective correctional meth-
ods which prevent convicted persons from harming others and provide
real opportunities for rehabilitation, and at the same time protect in-
dividual freedom and dignity.
A legislative standard, if it is to effectively limit impingements upon
religious freedom, must demand that the state's purpose be "compelling,"
or at least "substantial," and that the means taken to accomplish the
state's objective be the least restrictive which are feasible. Such a stand-
ard would still leave substantial discretionary power in the hands of
prison officials. Presumably it would mean that a prisoner would be able
to correspond with Elijah Muhammed, spiritual leader of the Muslims,
even though Muhammed is an ex-convict.13 It would also dictate that
a prisoner be permitted to wear a beard if it is required by his faith.54
Whether it would require that Muslims be provided a pork-free diet
even if that entailed some additional expense and administrative in-
convenience is less clear. Speculating about these questions only
illustrates that the legislature can, if it wishes, consider and answer
51. Jones v. WiUingham, 248 F. Supp. 791, 794 (D. Kan. 1965).
52. See Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Wis. 1972), rev'd, - F.2d
- (7th Cir. 1973).
53. Cf. Long v. Katzenbach, 258 F. Supp. 89 (M.D. Pa. 1966), modified sub nom.
Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1968).
54. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
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each of these more specific questions. Since providing additional serv-
ices, such as special diets and part-time clergy, turns more on the avail-
ability of resources than anything else, the question may be appro-
priate for legislative decision. It is doubtful that many legislators
would wish to enact legislation with such detail, however. Questions of
permissible religious activity often overlap with other first amendment
problems and can take a variety of forms which are most difficult to
regulate at the legislative level, except by general principle.
Assuming substantial discretionary power is granted, which is al-
ways likely, administrative rules can play a significant part in confining
the discretion of prison personnel in determining when to accommo-
date the desired religious activities of prisoners. Rules, for example,
can spell out the extent to which the food service is required to alter-
nate pork and non-pork meals so that Muslims can observe their dietary
restrictions without having inadequate nutrition. Rules can be promul-
gated which require personnel to provide religious services for segre-
gated prisoners. Rule-making, especially at the department or division
level, ensures that policies are established, as they should ber by those
at the upper levels of administration, rather than on an ad hoc basis by
lower-level personnel.
One additional matter deserves notice. Provision of clergy by the
state is necessary if confined men are to have the opportunity to prac-
tice their religion. But the state should not encourage religious par-
ticipation by providing rewards. Prison clergy sometimes submit re-
ports to be included in a prisoner's file which comment upon his re-
ligious activities.56 A favorable report may well enhance a prisoner's
parole chances. Prisoners may thus feel compelled to participate in
religious activities despite their own preferences, a result contrary to
the spirit of the establishment clause. It would be better if the Model
Act banned clergy reports, which seem to be of marginal value any-
how. At least one court has done so.57
2. Political Freedom
I Section 2(f) also prohibits discriminatory treatment based on po-
litical belief. Belief, of course, is always constitutionally protected.5 8
55. See Caplan, supra note 14, at 503.
56. See, e.g., Theriault v. Carlson, 339 F. Supp. 375 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
57. Id. at 381, 382.
58. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940); Sostre v. McGinnis,
442 F.2d 178, 202 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972).
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The difficulty is determining the extent of protection when the prisoner
seeks to act upon his beliefs. Prison officials long thought it essential
that a prisoner's intellectual diet be severely restricted. The stated pur-
poses of this policy were at least twofold. First, the needs of security
required that prisoners not receive material which would contribute
to rebellion or escape. Secondly, the ideal of rehabilitation could not
be achieved unless undesirable influences were screened out of pris-
oners' lives. To these ends, limits were placed upon what a prisoner
would be allowed to read, hear, and say.
a. Reading Matter
It is a common practice to permit prisoners to receive from outside
the prison only those books, magazines, and newspapers which have
been approved by the prison staff.59 There have been some com-
plaints that these limitations have not been fairly established or fairly
applied. A black prisoner asserted that he was not permitted to sub-
scribe to the black newspapers, The Amsterdam News and The Pitts-
burgh Courier, as well as the black magazines, Ebony, Sepia, and
Tan." The prison had promulgated a "home town" rule which had
apparently been discriminatorily applied. White publications not
from a prisoner's home town were routinely allowed; black publica-
tions were not. Further, the rule itself worked in a discriminatory
fashion simply because fewer black publications existed and these were
located only in several large cities. Section 2(f) of the Model Act
obviously is intended to prevent this sort of action by prison admin-
istrators, but by itself it is not likely to be effective. Evenhandedness
in regulating the admission of reading matter into a prison requires
careful structuring and checking of the discretionary power being ex-
ercised. Presently, the discretion to decide what may be read is broad,
often resting solely in the hands of the responsible staff member, who
may or may not be guided by a brief and broadly worded policy state-
ment. 1  Decisions may be made without stating any reason; the pris-
59. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-7-2(a) (Smith-Hurd 1973).
60. Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968).
61. See, e.g., Oklahoma Department of Corrections, Inmate Manual of Rules and
Regulations 13 (1969) (newspapers and books must be of "proper character"); Tennes-
see Department of Correction, Guidance Manual for Prisoners 15 (1965) (magazines,
books, and newspapers must be from "approved list"). Many prison manuals contain
no standards beyond providing that incoming mail may be censored. See, e.g., Arizona
State Prison, Inmate Rule Book (undated); Oregon State Penitentiary, Inmate's Hand-
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oner is simply informed that he may not have the material.0 2 These
practices, if continued, will defeat the mandate of the Model Act.
Administrators should articulate as carefully as they can the factors
which determine whether a publication is acceptable. The decision-
maker should be required to state his reasons in writing, at least when
rejecting material. 6z He should also notify the affected inmate if the
material is rejected, so that the inmate will have an opportunity to
object and present reasons why the material should be allowed.H The
written decisions, absent a compelling reason to the contrary, ought to be
available to all so that both the decision-makers and the next-affected
prisoner can compare the case with earlier results, an essential step
in minimizing discriminatory treatment. 5  Secret decision-making
breeds suspicion, in prison more than out, and it should be avoided
much more than it presently is. Further, the affected prisoner should
be informed that he has the right to appeal the decision to a superior
officer. These decisions, usually made by individual staff members,
should be open to review so that arbitrariness can be checked.
An important failure of the Model Act is that it only prohibits dis-
criminatory treatment based on political or social belief; as with re-
ligious activity, it provides no affirmative protection. Prison adminis-
trators can prohibit whatever activities they wish so long as they do
not discriminate. An example will illustrate the need to remedy this.
In New York a prison administrator decided to bar Fortune News, a
newsletter which contains articles about prison reform, ex-prisoner re-
habilitation, and other activities of the Fortune Society. 0 The admin-
istrators pointed to no rule, regulation, or policy statement upon which
they relied. The only information available to the court, upon chal-
lenge, was provided by the Executive Secretary of the Fortune Society;
book (1971); South Dakota State Penitentiary, Inmate Rule Book (1971). Legislation
has not been very precise. See generally Goldfarb & Singer, Redressing Prisoners'
Grievances, 39 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 175, 221-22 (1970); Turner, Establishing the Rule
of Law in Prisons: A Manual for Prisoners' Rights Litigation, 23 STAN. L. Rv. 473,
485-86 (1971).
62. See, e.g., Fortune Soc'y v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901, 903 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
63. Cf. Sostre v. Otis, 330 F. Supp. 941, 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
64. A prisoner may conceivably have some personal difficulty which makes it in-
appropriate for him to read certain kinds of material, but this would probably be rare.
65. It may be that the large number of routine affirmative decisions would make
it wasteful to require written decisions in these instances, but they would undoubtedly
be useful.
66. Fortune Soc'y v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901, 905 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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he had been informed that Fortune News was banned because it did
not reflect the truth concerning conditions in prison facilities. The
complaint here was not discrimination; the authorities may have been
ready to ban anything which did not in their view reflect the truth, or
which was critical of their performance. Legislation can help solve this
difficulty only by limiting the discretion of administrators to decide
what is permissible reading matter. The court concluded that no "com-
pelling state interest" was advanced which would justify the ban. Ma-
terial could be banned, the court concluded, "only upon a showing of
a clear and present danger to prison discipline or security." 7  Another
court repeated this test, and added "or some other substantial interference
with the orderly functioning of the institution." '  Still another court
preferred a "clear and probable danger" test, since it thought the "pres-
ent danger" test required an element of brinksmanship inappropriate in
a prison setting." Any legislatively imposed standard must, of course,
meet these developing constitutional limitations upon an administrator's
discretion.
Again it is a question of determining the extent to which the legisla-
tion should limit the discretion of prison administrators. Here, as be-
fore, a general principle may be all that is possible. Presently, censor-
ship of reading matter is severe.70 To alter this legislatively, the stand-
ard adopted would necessarily require greater justification for censor-
ing than that it furthered, in some way, the state interests of security,
institutional order, or rehabilitation. A legislative standard which
requires the state to show an immediate threat to institutional order to
justify excluding reading materials would put some limit on the dis-
cretion of prison administrators. The impact of the printed word
is usually not so dramatic that immediate violence or disobe-
67. Id.
68. Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1968), modifying Long v. Katzenbach,
258 F. Supp. 89 (M.D. Pa. 1966) (religious material). See also Banks v. Havener, 234
F. Supp. 27, 30 (E.D. Va. 1964).
69. Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F. Supp. 1036, 1057-58 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd, 435
F.2d 1255 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 936 (1971) (religious material).
See also Rowland v. Jones, 452 F.2d 1005, 1006 (8th Cir. 1971) (newspaper with
"substantially inflammatory effect" may be barred); Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d
23, 29 (5th Cir. 1969). Whether the standards demanded in cases concerning reli-
gious publications govern non-religious matter is not clear.
70. See, e.g., Rowland v. Jones, 452 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1971); Collins v.
Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257 (D. Md. 1972); Payne v. Whitmore, 1 PRISON L. REP.
4 (N.D. Cal. 1971); In re Littrell, I PRuSON L. REP. 183 (Super. Ct. San Luis Obispo
County, Cal. 1972).
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dience can confidently be predicted, except under unusual circum-
stances. At the same time, it is a shared belief of prison adminis-
trators that the climate of a prison can be much affected by the kinds
of views to which prisoners are exposed.r Permitting prisoners, some
of whom have demonstrated gross immaturity, to read provocative
materials can, under this view, create a climate of dissatisfaction and
unrest. What is needed is a legislative principle which would prevent
censorship based only on the ground that the material contains
political and social ideas at variance with those encouraged by
the administration, but would still permit prison administrators to
act on their fears when there is evidence that an explosive atmosphere
exists which makes it necessary to prevent provocative materials from
entering the prison, even if only momentarily. The proposed formula-
tion would grant ample discretionary power to permit authorities to
intercede in the event it became plain that the climate was unusually
tense.72
A troublesome matter is the extent to which censorship should be
permitted in the name of rehabilitation. Outside the prison it is a basic
tenet that reading material, with the curious exception of sexual material,
is not to be suppressed simply because it contains ideas which some
think will harm the reader. Still, we have charged the prisons, in
part at least, with the task of rehabilitating those sent there. The dif-
ficulty is that very little is known about how rehabilitation can be ac-
complished.78  Prison administrators have not been eager to evaluate
any of their practices designed to rehabilitate. No one knows what
impact the reading of various kinds of literature has on prisoners or
anyone else. This may suggest that the judgment should be left to the
discretion of prison administrators. But because it is not clear what
should be done, the opportunity for arbitrary decision-making is great.
It seems to me that, on balance, censorship in the name of rehabilita-
tion ought to be limited to those instances in which there is some con-
sensus of informed opinion that the material is damaging. Articulating
71. See Seattle-Tacoma Newspaper Guild v. Parker, 1 PRISON L. REP. 229, 231
(W.D. Wash. 1972), af'd, 480 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1973) (testimony of the Director
of Prisons of the State of California).
72. See Rowland v. Jones, 452 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1971); Walker v. Blackwell,
411 F.2d 23, 29 (5th Cir. 1969).
73. See Robison & Smith, The Effectiveness of Correctional Programs, 17 CRIME
& DELINQUENcY 67 (1971); Ward, Evaluations of Correctional Treatment: Some
Implications of Negative Findings, in LAw ENFORCEMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNROLOoY
201 (S. Yefsky ed. 1967).
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a limiting legislative standard in this area is not an easy task. Obscene
materials can, of course, be constitutionally banned, but even the Su-
preme Court has had difficulty in developing an understandable defi-
nition of obscenity. It may be reasonable to ban materials which pre-
sent criminal activity in a favorable light; interpretations of a statute
which attempted to do so, however, could vary significantly. What-
ever the difficulty of finding adequate statutory language, what is
needed is some guarantee of access to materials presenting a variety
of political and social views. Until there are clear demonstrations to
the contrary, we ought to apply our basic belief that exposure to such
materials benefits, rather than harms, the reader.
Whatever legislative protection is provided is likely to be stated as
a general principle. The usual prescription for the development of
rules which set forth special criteria of nonacceptability is applicable
here. Equally as important, rules must provide for prompt notice to
the addressee in the event of rejection, together with written reasons
and an opportunity to appeal an adverse decision to a higher authority
within the administrative hierarchy. The written decisions should be
available both to other decision-makers and to other prisoners so that
consistency may be furthered.74
b. Prisoner Correspondence
It was disappointing to discover that the Model Act contains nothing
about prisoner correspondence. Correspondence has always been
closely monitored by administrators, and this practice has been a bone
of contention between them and prisoners. In recent years the con-
flict has spilled over into the courts. A look at some of the problems
will make clear the need for both legislation and administrative rule-
making to regulate this practice.
A troublesome restriction is that which prevents prisoners from writ-
ing to the news media. Such correspondence, almost always unflat-
tering to prison authorities, has been prevented on several grounds:
it would present a false picture of prison life; it would create unrest
within the prison; and it would require administrative time to respond
to queries engendered by the correspondence. 75  None of these reasons
74. See Taylor v. Perini, 1 PRisoN L. REP. 268 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
75. See Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 326 F. Supp. 209 (D. Mass.), rev'd, 451 F.2d 545
(1st Cir. 1971); Fortune Soc'y v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970).
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seems adequate. Prison administrators, as public officials, must ex-
pect and accept criticism, even though the criticism may at times
be distorted and inaccurate.
Professor Ohlin of the Harvard Law School, in an affidavit sub-
mitted on behalf of a Massachusetts inmate, stated:
When prisoners riot or go on strike one of their demands is almost
always access to reporters. Prisoners often feel that, in ordinary cir-
cumstances, they have no effective way of bringing their grievances to
public attention. Costly and destructive prison riots are primarily
designed to call public attention to felt abuses rather than bring about
escaper n
Professor Ohlin therefore speculated that permitting letters to the news
media might aid in maintaining, rather than destroying, discipline.
Certainly some administrative time is required to respond to public
criticism, and, occasionally, a prisoner may feel he has bested authori-
ties in a public debate. Still, on balance, the value of such criticism,
not only to the prisoners but to the community, seems clearly to out-
weigh the disadvantages. Letters which are so inflammatory that they
may cause trouble upon return to the prison in printed form can be
dealt with at that time under the standards appropriate for other printed
material. The feasibility of Professor Ohlin's suggestion is demon-
strated by the United States Bureau of Prisons' policy of permitting un-
fettered correspondence to the media through its "Prisoners' Mail
Box. 77
We have at least one judicial pronouncement on the subject; Judge
Wyzanski concluded that a prisoner ought to be entitled to correspond
with the media unless authorities have "reasonable ground (not neces-
sarily probable cause)" to believe that the letters present a risk to se-
curity, discipline, or rehabilitation.78 I would prefer a stiffer stand-
ard, one which ensures that a prisoner may correspond with the media
unless some immediate threat to state interests would result. The desire
to suppress criticism, understandable in all men, is not absent among
prison administrators. Administrators readily believe that refusing to
76. Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 326 F. Supp. 209, 212 (D. Mass.), rev'd, 451 F.2d 545
(1st Cir. 1971). For a similar view of prison riots, see G. SYKEs, T-E Socmar Or
CAPnvEs: A STUDY OF A MAXIMuM SECURITY PRISON 8 (1958).
77. United States Bureau of Prisons, Policy Statement No. 1220.1A (Feb. 11,
1972), reprinted in 1 PRISON L. REP. 99, 100 (1972).
78. Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 326 F. Supp. 209, 212 (D. Mass.), rev'd, 451 F.2d 545
(1st Cir. 1971).
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permit a critical letter is for the good of the prison, not a product of
selfish motives. Only a clear pronouncement by the legislature that, ab-
sent unusual circumstances, such criticism is to be allowed is likely to
be effective in giving prisoners an opportunity to publicly air their
grievances.7 1
We need here, as elsewhere, not only a legislative standard but the
full panoply of administrative procedures geared to exercising fairly
the discretionary power granted. It is important that prison adminis-
trators articulate, in advance, those factors which are relevant to de-
ciding whether particular correspondence to the news media is per-
missible. And when a decision is made, at least a negative one, a
brief written record should be made of the reasons, notice to the pris-
oner should be required, and opportunity to appeal provided.
The Constitution requires that prisoners be permitted to correspond
freely and confidentially with judges and other public officials."0 It
is fundamental that persons kept by others in the name of the state
must be allowed reasonable opportunity to communicate, uninterrupted,
with public officials to prevent the abuse of state authority. The
Model Act ought to include a provision which makes this explicit.
Prisoners should be entitled to correspond freely with lawyers as well.
A lawyer is often essential in dealing effectively with the state. There
has been some suggestion that at least a few lawyers cannot be trusted
not to traffic in contraband, plan escapes, impede rehabilitation, or
otherwise aid the prisoner in avoiding prison regulations."' Although
this is possible, it must be weighed against the substantial interest in
permitting unfettered correspondence. Whether confidential corre-
spondence with a lawyer is constitutionally required is not yet clear, 2
79. The United States Bureau of Prisons has admirably solved the problem by not
examining letters to the media at all. Policy Statement No. 1220.1A, supra note 77,
at § 4b.
80. This is the practice of the United States Bureau of Prisons. Id.
81. Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1022 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Note, Prison
Mail Censorship and the First Amendment, 81 YALE L.J. 87, 99 (1971).
82. See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 200-01 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 978 (1972), noted in 1972 WAsH. U.L.Q. 347 (reading permitted); Sinclair v.
Henderson. 331 F. Supp. 1123, 1127 (E.D. La. 1971), remanded from 435 F.2d 125
(5th Cir. 1970) (same); Marsh v. Moore, 325 F. Supp. 392, 394-95 (D. Mass. 1971)
(may physically examine, not read); Peoples v. Wainwright, 325 F. Supp. 402 (M.D.
Fla. 1971) (same); Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 788-89 (D.R.I. 1970).
Packages could be prohibited as a security precaution; prison authorities can physically
manipulate letters to ensure that they contain no contraband. Perhaps the authorities
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but it ought to be provided for by legislation. The likelihood of serious
harm occurring seems to be so outweighed by the need to maintain
unimpaired communication with counsel that legislative direction ought
to put this matter beyond the discretion of prison administrators.
The principal restrictions upon mail concern not correspondence
with the news media, public officials, courts, or lawyers, but rather
mine-run correspondence with friends and relatives. Letters, both out-
going and incoming, are read to determine their content. Sometimes
they are selectively censored to delete that which is thought undesir-
able; other times they may be withheld entirely. The permissible sub-
ject matter of correspondence is severely limited. Typically, it may
contain only information of a personal nature to the prisoner and his
correspondent and may not discuss other inmates, prison events, or
prison policies. Slanderous, obscene, or vulgar language is not per-
mitted. One prison system went so far as to provide that letters should
be "cheerful in content. '8 3  Furthermore, prisoners have been limited
to corresponding with persons whose names appear on a list previously
approved by staff members.
Prison administrators assert that legitimate governmental interests
dictate these restrictions. The prison is kept secure by the detection
of escape plots, the interception of contraband such as weapons and
drugs, and the censorship of inflammatory writings. The prisoner is
rehabilitated by limiting his contacts to persons thought to have a ben-
eficial influence upon him. But these steps, questions of effectiveness
aside, are not without cost. The privacy of intimate thoughts
and feelings has long been regarded as essential to human dignity.
Knowing that one's letters are read by a staff member has a dampen-
ing effect on correspondence. Nor is the time and effort spent in cen-
soring mail negligible.
It is not entirely clear what ought to be done. At the least, we
could be allowed to open letters to make a closer inspection for contraband only in
the presence of the prisoner-recipient. In extreme instances, if authorities had reason
to believe the correspondence contained illegal matter, a search warrant could be ob-
tained to open and read it.
83. Arizona State Prison, Inmate Rule Book 14-16 (undated). See Lebanon
[Ohio] Correctional Institution, Inmate Instruction Manual 24-25 (1970); Minne-
sota Correctional Institution for Women, Inmate Rules 10-11 (1969); Tennessee De-
partment of Correction, Guidance Manual for Prisoners 13-16 (1965). See also
Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 782 (D.R.I. 1970); Carothers v. Follette,
314 F. Supp. 1014, 1024-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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should require prison administrators to articulate, in writing, those
factors considered relevant in determining what is to be censored.
Again, specific criteria for nonacceptability should be articulated. One
criterion, for example, is whether the letter encourages the recipient to
engage in criminal activity. A factor which ought not be relevant is
whether the letter is critical of prisons or those who run them. There
seems to be even less reason to stop critical letters home than there is
to stop critical correspondence with the news media. An argument can
be made that this kind of complaining is inconsistent with the pris-
oner's rehabilitation, but this contention seems rather thin. At least
one court has flatly held that withholding a letter which criticized the
prison, addressed to the prisoner's parents, was unconstitutional. s4
Prisoners ought to be given a good deal of latitude in determining what
they wish to write about. There is little reason to believe that you can
improve a person's attitude by not permitting him to say what is on
his mind. There may be somewhat more room for limiting what is
read in personal correspondence than there is in the case of printed
material. Whatever the influence of the written word, it is plausible
to suppose that personal letters have a greater impact than impersonal
matter such as books and magazines. Still, censorship is a tenuous busi-
ness at best, and administrative rules should be developed which put
some firm limits upon the discretion of those who do the censoring.
Because personal relationships can have an impact upon the develop-
ment of personality, there may be something to be said for regulating
with whom prisoners may correspond. Factors relevant in determining
whether a person may be placed on an approved correspondence list
ought to be carefully spelled out. Each time a decision is made, a
brief written statement of the reasons should be given. An interesting
idea, judicially adopted in one instance, 5 is to permit all correspond-
ence from persons on an approved list to be opened but not read.
This practice has much to recommend it. It enables prison adminis-
trators to be certain that nothing is sent in with the letters, and at
the same time permits prisoners to correspond privately with at least
84. Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1025 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The letter
said: "The prison system in New York State stinks .... The people in charge are
not qualified .... Hanky panky with U.S. mail .... Anything to obstruct legal
work." Id. at 1021. See also Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 790 (D.R.I.
1970); Note, Prison Mail Censorship and the First Amendment, 81 YALE LJ. 87, 97
(1971).
85. Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 791 (D.R.I. 1970).
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their most intimate friends and relatives. A related idea is to permit
prisoners to correspond with persons not on an approved list but to
permit censoring of that mail. Surely not everything written between
the prisoner and his correspondent will be harmful.80 The time pres-
ently spent in censoring correspondence with those on the list could be
eliminated and would, I think, more than cover the time needed to
read correspondence with those off the list.
The Department of Corrections of the State of Washington does not
open outgoing mail. 7 Other systems have experimented with spot cen-
sorship with successful results."" The threat to security may not be
as significant as has been widely assumed.89 Because corresponding is
an important activity, prison authorities ought to be required to accom-
plish their ends by the least restrictive means.90
Whether meaningful legislative limits can be developed, in light of
the conflicting policy considerations, is problematic. There may be
some value in establishing, as a general principle, that correspondence
with people outside the prison is beneficial and is to be permitted un-
less it is a threat to security and institutional order or is detrimental
to the rehabilitation of the prisoner. Obviously, this would confine dis-
cretion only very broadly, leaving the critical policy decisions to ad-
ministrators. The legislature could go further and provide a stiffer
standard, one which demanded an immediate threat to security or or-
der. It could limit censorship grounded upon rehabilitation to writ-
ings which encourage future criminality. Or, if it wished, it could com-
pletely eliminate the discretion to censor, permitting only that incom-
ing correspondence be opened to detect physical contraband. The
draftsmen ought to assess the merits of the various security, institu-
tional order, and rehabilitation arguments and recommend legislation
accordingly. The matter is too important to ignore.91
86. Note, Prison Mail Censorship and the First Amendment, 81 YALE LE . 87
(1971).
87. See MANuAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARm s 546.
88. Id.
89. It has been suggested statistically that escape is not a primary problem in
prisons. It should be noted that the statistics relied upon are rather old. The drafts-
men should examine recent statistics to aid in forming their judgment. See Singer,
Censorship of Prisoners' Mail and the Constitution, 56 A.B.AJ. 1051 (1970).
90. See Note, Prison Mail Censorship and the First Amendment, 81 YALE L.
87, 109(1971).
91. See Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F. Supp. 544, 555 (E.D. Wis. 1972), rev'd, -
F.2d - (7th Cir. 1973).
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c. Communication Among Prisoners and With Staff
Not surprisingly, the Model Act establishes no affirmative right of
communication among the prisoners themselves. There has as yet
been no judicial holding that prisoners have a constitutional right to
speak and associate with one another. It is clear, however, that pris-
oners have no right to assemble and petition for redress of grievances."'
In fact, prisoners have been encouraged, both formally and informally,
not to act as a group, but rather to "do their own time."93
This policy has been justified as a further step in insulating the of-
fender from undesirable influences, initially by removing him from the
community and subsequently by minimizing his association with other
prisoners. Clearly, however, prison security and order are factors at
least as important in the decision to pursue such a policy. It is
thought that limiting communications between prisoners and forbidding
most assemblies will discourage the kind of group-mindedness that
may lead to threatening group action.9  The courts have supported
these policies. A speech denigrating whites, made in the prison yard
within earshot of a crowd watching a ball game, was stopped.9 5 Circu-
lation of a letter discussing prison reform and urging the airing of griev-
ances was not allowed.9 6 Neither was circulated material which advo-
cated a sit-down strike.07  It is commonly believed that
attempts to speak in a milieu where such speech may incite an insurrec-
tion against the authorities must be tempered. Prison authorities cannot
be expected to permit such conditions in the name of free speech.
In a prison environment where the climate tends to be more volatile
92. See Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to
Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALn L.J. 506, 537 (1963).
93. Idaho State Board of Correction, Rules and Regulations Governing the In-
mates of Idaho State Penitentiary 25 (1962): "Do not permit any person to get you
into trouble . . . . Do not attempt to be a front or spokesman for other inmates.
You may be accused of interfering with their individual rights or attempting to cause
trouble. DO YOUR OWN TIME!"
94. E.g., North Carolina State Department of Correction, Rules and Policies
§ 2-213 (1969): "Inmates shall not agitate, unduly complain, or magnify grievances."
95. Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).
96. McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1964); Urbano v. McCorkle,
334 F. Supp. 161 (D.N.J. 1971), supplemented, 346 F. Supp. 51 (D.NJ. 1972). See
also Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 920
(1967).
97. Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415, 429 (D. Md.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 877 (1966).
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than in the streets, strong restraints and heavy penalties are in order.08
Obviously, some limits on speech and action are essential. The ap-
proach followed in the past, however, has been less successful in main-
taining order than might be expected. Inmates do not live in a vac-
uum; despite efforts to keep them apart, an inmate society does exist.99
The prisoners interact with each other and with the prison staff.
Powerful and prison-wise leaders often enter into a kind of informal
bargaining wit1 staff members, especially those at a lower level.' 00
This sort of bargaining occurs because administrators cannot control
an institution through authority alone;010 they lack the personnel. As in
any society, some voluntary cooperation of the governed is essential if
order is to be maintained, which, of course, is a primary goal of
administrators. This essential cooperation cannot be obtained without
offering something in return. Prison guards offer relaxation of
some rules to a limited number of inmates who, through influence or
force, are able to control other inmates.10 2  In exchange for some minor
rule-breaking and advantage-taking on the part of a few inmates, the
officers are given assurances that other inmates will stay in line. The
lower-level officer has a strong motive to enter into this arrangement,
since he is judged by his capacity to maintain order without constantly
writing disciplinary reports.' 03
A fault of this system, it is argued, 0 4 is that "illicit" behavior is re-
warded, thereby confirming in the powerful their belief in force and
coercion and confirming in the weak their self-perception as victims
of others' wrongdoing. Further, the scramble among prisoners to ob-
tain and keep a position in the hierarchy, a natural consequence of
uneven treatment, leads to constant tension and suspicion among in-
98. Id. at 429-30.
99. See McCleery, The Governmental Process and Informal Social Control, in
THE PRISON: STUDIES IN INSTITU1IONAL ORGANIZATION AND CHA E 149, 163 (D.
Cressey ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as McCleeryl.
100. See generally TASK FoRCE REPORT: CoRRECnTONS 46-47; Note, Bargaining in
Correctional Institutions: Restructuring the Relation Between the Inmate and the
Prison Authority, 81 YALE L.J. 726 (1972).
101. McCleery 164.
102. Id. at 161.
103. E.g., Oklahoma State Reformatory, Officer's Hand Book 87 (3d ed. 1965):
"While discipline is the first and highest consideration in a reformatory, the employee
who maintains it in his department with the lowest number of punishments or reports
of rule infractions deserves the most credit."
104. Note, Bargaining in Correctional Institutions: Restructuring the Relation Be-
tween the Inmate and the Prison Authority, 81 YALE L.L 726, 751-56 (1972).
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mates, rather than to a stable society. The result can be violence, both
covertly among inmates and overtly against staff members.
Permitting more open communication can serve to reduce the status
and authority of this inmate elite.' It has been suggested that per-
mitting inmates to negotiate collectively with administrators would be
a superior method of utilizing inmate leadership to accomplish social
control."" Whether this can be accomplished without substantial dis-
ruption is uncertain. 107 Nonetheless, limited self-government based upon
honest and well-supervised elections may be superior to present prac-
tice. Inmate councils have been authorized in Sweden which permit
"inmate participation in the operations and decision-making processes
of the institution."'' 0  Significantly, prisoners there are permitted
greater latitude in "speaking with others, reading freely, and being po-
litically active without intimidation or reprisal."'1 9  The Federal Bu-
reau of Prisons has also experimented with an inmate council, al-
though on a more limited scale." 0
A virtue of this altered kind of prison organization is that it may
induce reasoned negotiation and compromise, rewarding participation
and responsibility instead of coercion and brute force.'" Further,
open bargaining will result in all prisoners receiving the benefits flow-
ing from mutual cooperation, which ought to leave prisoners feeling
more fairly treated. Something of the sort of bargaining envisioned is
currently being undertaken by the Center for Correctional Justice in
Washington, D.C.1"2  A variety of non-judicial methods is being used
to settle disputes and resolve grievances, with the aid of that outside
group. Perhaps the most obvious beginning for bargaining is in the
prison industries, where much the same issues arise which concern labor
unions generally." 3
105. McCleery 168-88.
106. Fox, Why Prisoners Riot, 35 FED. PROBA ON 9 (1971).
107. McCleery 168-88.
108. Ward, Inmate Rights and Prison Reform in Sweden and Denmark, 63 J.
CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 240, 241 (1972). See also Manual of Comparative Correctional
Systems: United States and Sweden, 8 AM. L. BULL. 748, 757 (1972).
109. Ward, supra note 108, at 241.
110. See Fox, supra note 106, at 13.
111. See Note, Bargaining in Correctional Institutions: Restructuring the Relation
Between the Inmate and the Prison Authority, 81 YALE L.J. 726, 752 (1972).
112. Note, Labor Unions for Prison Inmates: An Analysis of a Recent Proposal
for the Organization of Inmate Labor, 21 BUFFALO L. Rlv. 963, 976 (1972).
113. Id. at 965-73.
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Whether American prisons ought to be moving in these directions
is a matter which obviously requires much thought and discussion.
We do not know the extent to which the draftsmen of the Model Act
considered these matters. It may be that it is too early to enact any
legislation, but it is certainly not too early to consider the impact which
law can have upon the nature of prisoner-staff relationships. The
draftsmen should, and doubtless do, consider their model as only a
beginning. What can and ought to be done in this area certainly war-
rants further consideration.
3. Visiting
The Model Act contains a section'14 providing for visits with pris-
oners by attorneys of record, relatives, and friends. The section re-
quires that rules and regulations be developed which permit visits at
reasonable times and under reasonable limitations. The section illus-
trates well what has been suggested in other contexts. A general prin-
ciple is established, with the details left to be worked out by each de-
partment, but under a requirement that rules be developed. Local
rules ought to include provisions determining not only when visits are
to be allowed, but also what factors are relevant in deciding who is to
be permitted to visit.115 Those who decide who may visit will make
the decisions more fairly if they are guided by stated criteria and if
they must justify at least negative decisions in writing. The written
decision need not be more than a few sentences indicating the facts
thought to warrant a refusal. This structure also facilitates both in-
ternal and judicial review.
The balance of this section is both heartening and disappointing. It
recognizes the principle that prisons are public institutions and that
citizens should have the right to visit and speak with prisoners. It
falters badly, however, in establishing adequate language to accomplish
that objective. A prospective visitor must "establish a legitimate rea-
son for such a visit" simply to make an application. The visit must
not be "inconsistent with the public welfare and the safety and secu-
rity of the institution." A visit may still be denied if the director con-
cludes that the "visit or any aspect of it would be disruptive to the pro-
114. MoDEL Aar § 7.
115. Prison administrators have customarily maintained approved visitor lists, be.
lieving that those thought to be undesirable influences should not be permitted to
maintain contact with prisoners.
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gram of the institution.""' 6  The vagueness of this language would be
troublesome enough if it were to be applied only to friends and rela-
tives of prisoners; unfortunately, the section is apparently intended to
apply to news reporters as well.
Prison officials claim that permitting reporters personal interviews
causes an undue strain upon the facilities of most prisons.117 The
argument seems more make-weight than real. But given the language
of the Model Act, an interview could presumably be denied because it
would be necessary to have a staff member escort the prisoner to an
interview room, thereby "disrupting the program of the institution."
A more serious objection is that interviews are likely to focus attention
on a few inmates, thereby inflating their importance and enabling them
in some instances to use the medium of the press to foster revolt within
the prison."" This difficulty can be met in a less restrictive way, how-
ever, by censoring any news article based upon an interview, should the
article prove to be so inflammatory that this is essential. 119
The public has a substantial interest in ensuring that the news media
are allowed to fully examine and report events which occur within the
prison system. Personal interviews are essential because "there is a
need to observe demeanor, to probe by questioning and to overcome the
barrier of semi-illiteracy and suspicion that may inhibit inmates when
they write."'120 Whether the draftsmen intended to open the prisons
to newsmen is unclear. In light of past resistance from prison admin-
istrators, the language of the Model Act seems unlikely to accomplish
116. MODEL ACT § 7.
117. See Washington Post Co. v. Kleindienst, 357 F. Supp. 770, 773-74 (D.D.C.),
judgment stayed pending appeal, 406 U.S. 912, remanded per curiam, 477 F.2d 1168
(D.C. Cir.), on remand, 357 F. Supp. 779 (D.D.C. 1972); Smith v. Bounds, 1 PRISON
L. REP. 144 (E.D.N.C. 1972), affd without opinion, 473 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1973)
(problems of deterring newsmen from smuggling contraband, arranging an interview
room, and providing security were too much to handle, according to administrators);
Seattle-Tacoma Newspaper Guild v. Parker, 1 PRISON L. REP. 99, 101 (W.D. Wash.
1971), dismissed, 1 PRISON L. REP. 229 (W.D. Wash. 1972), affd, 480 F.2d 1062
(9th Cir. 1973) (affidavit of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons).
118. Washington Post Co. v. Kleindienst, 357 F. Supp. 770, 774 (D.D.C.), judgment
stayed pending appeal, 406 U.S. 912, remanded per curiam, 477 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir.),
on remand, 357 F. Supp. 779 (D.D.C. 1972).
119. The standards applied should be the same as those governing printed matter
generally. See notes 59-74 supra and accompanying text.
120. Washington Post Co. v. Kleindienst, 357 F. Supp. 770, 773 (D.D.C.), judg-
ment stayed pending appeal, 406 U.S. 912, remanded per curiam, 477 F.2d 1168 (D.C.
Cir.), on remand, 357 F. Supp. 779 (D.D.C. 1972).
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that end. Permission to interview, it has been held, should be denied
"only where demonstrable administrative or disciplinary considerations
dominate."12' This language is somewhat more restrictive of admin-
istrative discretion than that of the Model Act, which would permit a
denial should the department responsible for operating the prison feel
that the interview would be "inconsistent with the public welfare."1 2  Ob-
viously, a prison administrator could easily convince himself that an
interview likely to produce a story not in harmony with the department's
version of events would be "inconsistent with the public welfare." The
section should be redrafted to provide a statement of principle which
makes explicit that, except in limited circumstances, interviews by
news reporters are to be permitted. Further, rules should be promul-
gated which detail the factors which must be considered in deciding
whether a visit is to be permitted, require the relevant factors to be
incorporated in a written decision, and provide for notice and an oppor-
tunity to appeal within the administrative hierarchy.
Some protection against rigid interpretation of the language of the
second paragraph of this section is obtained by the provision that a
court of general jurisdiction may review the denial of an application to
visit. Written administrative decisions would facilitate judicial review.
The court, in addition to reviewing whether the visit would "disrupt
the program of the institution,"' 8 must also find that the "person is a
representative of a public concern regarding the conditions of the
prison," and "not a mere curiosity seeker."' 2 4  Judicial review, of
course, can help ensure that reporter interviews are not denied for
petty reasons. The legislature can do better at the outset, however,
by providing an adequate standard.
D. Discipline
Section 3 of the Model Act provides that certain minimal conditions
must be met in solitary confinement cells. The cells must be of regular
size, must be lighted during the day, must be kept within normal tem-
peratures, and must include a toilet and bedding. Prisoners are to be
121. Id. at 775. Interestingly, the court cited the Model Act approvingly as per-
mitting interviews, but then established a better standard. Id. at 774-76.
122. MODEL AcT § 7.
123. This is poor drafting since the substantive criteria established for judicial re-
view are different from those the administrator is to apply in the first instance.
124. MODEL Acr § 7.
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provided clothing, adequate food, and water for drinking and wash-
ing. It is a good statute, for it provides the kind of detail which is
possible when the legislature knows what it wants. It is also, regret-
tably, a much needed one.'25 Extreme deprivation has been used far
too often in dealing with prisoners.
1. Varieties of Disciplinary Confinement
The Model Act specifically provides that solitary confinement may
not be used as punishment. At first blush this seems most unusual.
To appreciate this provision it is necessary to define the term "soli-
tary" and note a new trend in prison discipline. A solitary cell is one
with a closed front made of solid metal as distinct from the usual grilled
type. The closed front is intended to prevent any conversation or con-
tact between the occupant and others. Hence, the occupant is in "sol-
itary." This can be a very destructive experience, especially when
prolonged. Recognizing this, some systems have confined its use to
very limited purposes. The Federal Bureau of Prisons, for example,
has provided that solitary confinement may not be used for pun-
ishment but only for the purpose of isolating a prisoner who is "demon-
strating exceptionally destructive or threatening behavior or overt emo-
tional actions."' 2 6  He may be physically abusing another prisoner or
staff member, destroying property, or simply shouting abuse. The
prisoner is placed in solitary confinement so that he cannot affect oth-
ers while he is emotionally out of control. The prisoner is to be removed
from solitary confinement as soon as he is calm enough not to repeat
his earlier behavior.
The Model Act has apparently adopted this approach. The prisoner
"may be so confined only under conditions of emergency for his own
protection and that of personnel or other prisoners. Confinement un-
der such circumstances shall not be continued for longer than is neces-
125. There have been, in recent years, numerous cases concerning conditions in
punishment cells. See, e.g., Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967), on re-
mand, 321 F. Supp. 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1970), affd in part and rev'd in part, 460 F.2d 126
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972); Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp.
767 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969); Holt
v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969), supplemented, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.
Ark. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674
(N.D. Cal. 1966).
126. United States Penitentiary at Marion, Policy Statement No. 7400.5B, § 18
(1970).
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sary for the emergency.' 127  The use of solitary is obviously intended
to be exceptional; the highest ranking officer is to be informed within
the hour when a prisoner is so confined. Further, to minimize physical
danger, within forty-eight hours the prisoner must be examined by
medical personnel. 28  The detail in this section is admirable, so far
as it goes.
These limitations suggest that solitary confinement is not the only
string in an administrator's bow. The decline in the use of solitary
confinement as a punishment device has been paralleled by the growth
of another method of dealing with difficult prisoners. Known variously
as the "Adjustment Center," "Special Housing," or the "Segregation
Unit,'' 29 it is a designated area-a cell block, wing, or unit-where
prisoners who have broken rules or are deemed otherwise unsuited
for inclusion with the main population are kept. In appearance the
units are similar to those housing regular prisoners, with a row of open-
front cells which permit conversation among the prisoners and with the
staff. Life in these units, however, is substantially different from ordi-
nary prison life. A regular prisoner typically spends his day at a work
or school assignment and his early evenings in some form of recreation.
The segregated prisoner remains in his cell most of the time and always
remains in the unit, except in emergencies. He earns no additional good
time and seriously damages his opportunity for parole. By whatever
name, this status is detrimental to the prisoner, with serious immediate
and long-range consequences.
It is not clear whether the draftsmen of the Model Act took note of
these developments. The opening clause of section 3 defines solitary
confinement as "segregation in a special cell or room." Although this
language alone could be construed to include what has just been de-
scribed, the balance of the section precludes such a construction. As
I have noted, the Model Act does not permit solitary confinement for
punishment but only temporary isolation of those behaving in a threat-
127. M EOD ACT § 3(d).
128. Id. § 3(f). Section 3(g) requires that a log be kept and all unusual events be
recorded. Doubtlessly, experience will suggest what kind of information will be use-
ful. Administrative rules can aid in the development of this desirable practice.
129. In California the term "Adjustment Center" is used. In the Federal Bureau
of Prisons it is called a "Segregation Unit." I have heard the term "Special Housing"
suggested as an appropriate euphemism. These units are different in some respects
from the "hole" as it existed in the past, although prisoners still refer to the units by
that name.
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ening or destructive way. It cannot be that the draftsmen intended
to ban confinement as a punishment; therefore, it must be that seg-
regation units of the sort described, which are certainly used as pun-
ishment, were not intended to be regulated by section 3.
The Model Act ought to include provisions which specifically regulate
segregation units, whether they are considered punitive or adminis-
trative. 130 A provision similar to that in section 3 which guarantees
basic living conditions should be included, although it is probably less
needed here, since these units are not commonly used to deprive the
prisoner physically, as solitary confinement cells often are. What is
essential, however, because of the relatively long-term confinement
common to these facilities, are provisions which ensure adequate op-
portunity for physical exercise outside the cell, adequate reading mat-
ter and other pastimes inside the cell, and periodic medical examina-
tions to determine whether the prisoner is both physically and men-
tally able to endure prolonged segregation. Here, as elsewhere, de-
tailed administrative regulations would be most useful in implementing
legislative mandates.
2. Procedural Protections
Section 4 of the Model Act requires that rules and regulations be
promulgated which ensure fair and equitable procedures in handling
disciplinary matters. Specified procedures are required only when the
prisoner's sentence or parole eligibility may be affected. In that case
a hearing must be held, at which the prisoner has a right to appear
with an advocate of his choice.
There are a number of flaws in this section. The language of the
Model Act completely excludes administrative segregation, which is most
unwise. 3' And the discretion it grants to administrators to develop
procedures is far too broad. Specific rules are mandated only when
sentence or parole eligibility is affected, 132 and therefore even the
130. Administrative segregation can be as detrimental to the prisoner as punitive
segregation. See West v. Cunningham, 456 F.2d 1264 (4th Cir. 1972); In re
Hutchinson, 23 Cal. App. 3d 337, 100 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1972); United States Bureau of
Prisons, Policy Statement No. 7400.5B (June 6, 1972).
131. See note 130 supra and accompanying text.
132. Typically, a prisoner's fixed sentence and parole eligibility are not affected, at
least directly, by confinement in segregated status. In the federal system, for example,
the good time granted by statute for proper conduct, 18 U.S.C. § 4161 (1970), is
computed and deducted from the prisoner's sentence. In effect, the prisoner is en-
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limited protections specified for such cases are not generally applicable.
Although I have urged, in numerous instances, that administrators be
granted authority to develop rules guided by general legislative prin-
ciples, this seems inappropriate here. Some procedural protections
are so basic that they should be specifically provided for by legisla-
tion.133
At the least, in every instance when a prisoner is threatened with
close confinement, he ought to have an opportunity to present his side
of the story.
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our juris-
prudence. One of these is that where governmental action seriously
injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends upon
fact findings, the evidence used to prove the Government's case must
be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show
that it is untrue. 34
The Model Act does not meet this test; it ensures a hearing only when
the punishment may affect sentence or parole eligibility. The Model
Act would certainly not be breaking new ground by establishing
this basic procedural requirement. Current procedural rules not only
provide opportunity for the prisoner to present his version of events,
but typically grant a hearing at which he may appear'"6 whenever
threatened with close confinement.'3 6  The Constitution requires at
least an opportunity to respond to charges, and perhaps a hearing. 3 7
titled to the good time unless it is taken away. Industrial good time, on the other
hand, must be earned and is credited as it is earned. A prisoner who is put in segre-
gation is usually not in a position to earn industrial good time, but his status need not
affect his conduct good time. Therefore, the parole date (which appears in his per-
sonal records) is not changed in any way. Prison authorities may decide to impose
an additional penalty by taking away already credited conduct good time, which would
move back the prisoner's established parole date, but this is not usually done. When
it is contemplated, Policy Statement 7400.6A(4) of United States Bureau of Prisons
requires that a separate hearing be conducted, at which time the prisoner may have the
assistance of staff counsel. Although this is open to interpretation, it appears that
the draftsmen of the Model Act intended to follow this model. Unlike the federal
system, however, the Model Act does not spell out the procedures to be followed in
the vast majority of cases not involving the removal of already earned good time.
133. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 304.7(3) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
134. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959).
135. There may be limited instances when ex parte hearings are warranted because
of the unruliness of the prisoner.
136. See, e.g., United States Bureau of Prisons, Policy Statement No. 7400.5B,
§ 5 (June 6, 1972).
137. See Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885
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Certain other procedural protections seem to be desirable beyond
dispute. The prisoner should be given notice of the charges against
him, preferably in writing, at some time before the hearing.' 38 What
little pre-hearing preparation is possible in a prison setting should be
facilitated by giving notice. Further, it has become the practice that
disciplinary decisions are made by a committee rather than by a single
individual. 139  The committee typically is composed of representatives
of both the treatment and security staffs. A collective judgment is
thought to be better than that of one person. It must be borne in
mind that prison administrators often have had extensive deal-
ings with those appearing before the committee and may easily have
developed a fixed opinion of a given prisoner. The weight of expe-
rience, both here and elsewhere, suggests that bias can be decreased
by requiring several persons to concur in a decision. The Model Act
should include such a requirement. 140
The decision-makers should be required to make written findings
of fact and to articulate their reasons for disposing of a case as they
did. This practice encourages rational decisions by requiring the de-
cision-makers to think through their reasons.' 4' Further, requiring
findings of fact and reasoned dispositional statements will establish
some precedent which will encourage an effort to be consistent. Lastly,
(1972) (notice, opportunity to reply, and reasonable investigation into facts required);
Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972),
noted in 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 347 (notice and opportunity to be heard required); United
States ex rel. Neal v. Wolfe, 346 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (hearing and right
to call and cross-examine witnesses required); Banks v. Norton, 346 F. Supp. 917
(D. Conn. 1972) (hearing by impartial board required); Clutchette v. Procunier,
328 F. Supp. 767, 783-85 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (hearing, right to call and cross-examine
witnesses, counsel, and written decision required); Bundy v. Cannon, 328 F. Supp.
165 (D. Md. 1971) (impartial hearing required); Meola v. Fitzpatrick, 322 F. Supp.
878, 886 (D. Mass. 1971) (notice and opportunity to reply required); Kritsky v.
McGinnis, 313 F. Supp. 1247 (N.D.N.Y. 1970) (hearing, impartial decision-maker, and
written decision required); Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970) (ex-
tensive rules negotiated).
138. See United States Bureau of Prisons, Policy Statement No. 7400.5B, § 5(c)
(1) (June 6, 1972) (requires written notice twenty-four hours after initial placement
in segregation).
139. See MAN AL OF CORRECnONAL STANDAEDS 410. My impression in conducting
a field study of disciplinary procedures at the United States Prison at Marion, Illiinois,
in the summer of 1972, was that the interaction of the members did produce a better
result.
140. The Model Penal Code includes this requirement. MODEL PENAL CODE
1 304.7(2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
141. DAvis 131.
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written decisions aid the person involved in deciding whether to appeal
and aid the reviewer in examining what was done.
It is not entirely clear what additional procedural steps ought to be
required beyond these minimums. It has long been believed that ra-
tional fact-finding is enhanced by requiring disputants to present evi-
dence through the testimony of witnesses and by permitting cross-
examination. Prison administrators have rejected these practices.
They claim that permitting testimony by witnesses only facilitates per-
jury, in part by encouraging aggressive inmates to coerce others to
testify falsely on their behalf. Indeed, the inmate social system may
well have some impact on the kind of testimony fellow prisoners are
likely to provide. Administrators have similarly been reluctant to re-
quire staff witnesses to appear, fearing that this would only provide
an opportunity for hostile inmates to abuse them. It may be that a
substantial and impartial pre-hearing investigation would be more suit-
able.142 On the other hand, there may be methods to avoid the sug-
gested problems at a hearing. Oregon has recently adopted a rule
that permits the prisoner to submit written questions to witnesses,
which the committee, in its discretion, may pose.148
Whether counsel-lay or otherwise-ought to be required is another
troublesome question, influenced to some extent by whether witnesses
are required or permitted. Certainly, disciplinary committee proce-
dures are sufficiently simple that law-trained persons are not required
on that score. But an advocate may be very useful in rooting out
facts and circumstances favorable to a prisoner that may not other-
wise be brought to light. Further, at the hearing lay counsel may serve
as a buffer between the two opposing sides, permitting a more unemo-
tional examination of the facts. Being cross-examined by a staff
member may be less offensive than being cross-examined by a pris-
oner. Unfortunately, we have had very little experience with these and
other alternatives and even less examination of their impact.' 44
142. The United States Bureau of Prisons has adopted this approach. United
States Bureau of Prisons, Policy Statement No. 7400.5B (June 6, 1972).
143. See Alternative Procedures for Corrections Division Disciplinary Actions §
IV(4), 1 PRISON L. REP. 356, 357 (1972) (action of the Governor of Oregon).
144. For a study examining the impact of Judge Pettine's extensive order in Morris
v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970), see Harvard Center for Criminal Justice,
Judicial Intervention in Prison Discipline, 63 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 200 (1972). See
also Kraft, Prison Disciplinary Practices and Procedures: Is Due Process Provided?,
47 N. DAX. L. REv. 9 (1970).
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The discretion of prison administrators in handling disciplinary mat-
ters is not likely to remain untouched, even without legislation. Judi-
cial intervention has become more frequent in this aspect of prison
administration than in others, perhaps because judges feel more com-
fortable with procedure than anything else. Legislation establishing
minimal procedural requirements and further administrative experi-
mentation may well produce more desirable results than piecemeal ju-
dicial intervention. But the initiative must be taken now, lest proce-
dures within prisons develop along constitutional lines in the same
fashion as police-field and custody procedures have, to similar disad-
vantage. 145
3. Substantive Law
Section 4 of the Model Act includes a requirement that substantive
rules be promulgated and the punishments for their violation be pre-
scribed. In a sense, this provision brings us full circle. Prisons early
developed extensive sets of rules which governed nearly every dimen-
sion of prison life. Every time an undesirable incident occurred, a
rule was created in the hope of preventing further similar occurrences.
This practice contributed to making prisons rigid, highly structured,
impersonal places. 48  Doing away with this mass of rules was advo-
cated in the name of reform. Flexibility was the byword, permitting
individualized handling of each situation. 41 Prisoners were to have
the opportunity to determine for themselves what was appropriate con-
duct so that they could develop internal checks and thereby grow in
judgment and maturity. As flexibility increased, however, prisoners
complained increasingly that they did not know what was expected of
them. The old rules often survived, not in written form, but in the
minds of correctional officers. The opportunity for inconsistent and
arbitrary application of unwritten and unclear rules obviously is great.
Some prisoners went so far as to yearn for the "good old days" when
everything was spelled out.148
145. See generally Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure,
53 CALIF. L. REV. 929 (1965); Neal, Judicial Activism, Nonjudicial Passivism, and
Law Reform, 48 Cm. B. REcoRD 240 (1967); Packer, The Courts, the Police, and the
Rest of Us, 57 J. CaIM. L.C. & P.S. 238 (1966).
146. See TAsK FoRca REPORT: CORRECTIONS 46-50.
147. Id.
148. A prison administrator of some experience told me that this was a fairly
common complaint in a modern medium-security facility which had few written rules.
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Having no written rules at all does leave substantial discretionary
power unconfined and unstructured. But the answer need not be to
re-enact all the old rules. The effort should be to find the optimal
balance between rules and discretion. The Model Act's requirement
ought to be taken as an opportunity to carefully re-think all rules and
regulations, written and unwritten, with an eye to developing a limited
but sound body of essential rules. Rules, written or unwritten, which
are picayune and only make prison life rigid and intolerable should be
abolished. 149 Minor incidents can be handled by admonishing the
prisoner and including the matter in the overall assessment of his
behavior. 10° The United States Bureau of Prisons, in its most recent
policy statement concerning discipline, has codified offenses.",' Doubt-
lessly, its compilation taxed the memory of many an old Bureau hand.
Included are the obvious, such as killing, assaulting another person,
stealing, and attempting to escape. Also included are the less obvious,
such as adulterating any food or drink, wearing a disguise or mask,
giving anything of value to another inmate, and contacting the pub-
lic without authorization. Experience may add more to the list. Al-
though difficult, it is worth the effort to develop a sound body of
rules, provided administrators curb the urge to include every conceiv-
able action to which anyone has ever objected.
The second part of the Model Act's provision requires that punish-
ments be prescribed. This is not usually done at present, at least in
the sense of establishing a fixed sentence for a given offense. It is
thought that completely individualized handling of each offender is de-
sirable.' 52 Consequently, administrators enjoy essentially open-ended
discretion to impose whatever punishment or to take whatever meas-
ures they deem appropriate. The incident which brings the prisoner
before the disciplinary committee may be viewed as nothing more
than a catalyst for a decision that the prisoner needs to be subjected
to much closer confinement for an extended period of time.
To develop completely fixed sentences for each stated offense is
more than anyone would consider desirable. On the other hand, leav-
149. See Glaser, How Institution Discipline Can Best Serve Correctional Purposes,
in BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE Am MODERN PENOLOGY 237 (W. Lyle & T. Homer eds. 1973).
150. The "silent beef"-prisoner argot for the insidious practice of putting seri-
ously damaging information in a prisoner's file without informing him-should not
be a problem since only minor matters could be handled in this fashion.
151. Policy Statement No. 7400.5B, § B (June 6, 1972).
152. See MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STADAI)xs 410.
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ing the matter completely open seems equally undesirable. Some mid-
dle ground should be workable. It may be useful to require adminis-
trators to establish the maximum sentence which could be imposed
for any given offense. It would even be an improvement simply to
require that a stated outside limit be established for each offender at
the time of "conviction" so that he would know the longest time he
could be confined.' Prison administrators undoubtedly would com-
plain that these requirements unduly limit their capacity to deal with
extremely difficult prisoners. But it is unwise to grant the discretion
to segregate a prisoner for an unlimited time, regardless of the nature
of his offense. The Model Penal Code would allow confinement in a
solitary cell only for serious or flagrant breaches of discipline, and for
a maximum of only thirty days. 54  It is apparently contemplated that
incorrigible prisoners would be dealt with by transfer to other institu-
tions rather than by extended segregation, as is often done now.'55
The Model Act, although it requires that punishments be prescribed,
is sufficiently broad in language to suggest that the draftsmen may
have meant only to require that the various punishments available to
the decision-makers be described. Legislatures can do better. They
can at least require that administrators develop a statement of criteria
relevant to determining what punishments are to be imposed. This
has been done with some success in the Model Sentencing Act, 56 which
regulates a closely analogous task. When a disposition is made the
committee should be required to apply those criteria and to prepare,
in writing, a statement setting out briefly those factors which it thought
controlling. Further, the Model Act ought to require, if not fixed sen-
tences, at least a periodic review of each prisoner's status to determine
whether he should remain in close confinement. Again, that review
should include a written statement of the reasons for the decision.
E. Grievance Procedures
Section 5 mandates the establishment of a grievance procedure pro-
viding for an investigation by a "person or agency outside of the de-
153. Oregon has imposed such a requirement. Alternative Procedures for Correc-
tions Division Disciplinary Actions §§ V(1)(d), (e), 1 PRisoN L. REP. 356, 358 (1972)
(action of the Governor of Oregon).
154. MODEL PENAL CODE § 304.7(3) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
155. Id.
156. NAToNAL COUNCIL ON Cirms AND DELINQUENCY, MODEL SsurENcINo ACT
§§ 5, 6 (2d ed. 1972).
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partment."'157 This provision may well help meet what prisoners
strongly feel is a substantial need: access to outsiders to whom they
can complain. The need is not unlike that which moved many citizens
to request the establishment of review boards to which they could
bring complaints about the police. Some of the problems encountered
in creating police review boards are similar to those involved in the
establishment of inmate grievance procedures. 1 8
It can be argued that outsiders do not have the expertise to assess
the merits of various prison administration actions. Placing authority
to make judgments in outsiders may adversely affect the morale of
prison staff. Further, the creation of such an investigating agency
creates the impression that prison administrators either are incompetent
or cannot be trusted to discipline their own staffs. On the other hand,
it may be argued that the very lack of direct involvement in prison ad-
ministration is a strength in that it brings a more objective judgment
to the appraisal of prison operations. Further, it has been argued
that we are entitled to be skeptical of the vigor and evenhandedness
likely to be brought to an investigation of wrongdoing in the investi-
gator's own department.
Under the Model Act, the power to designate the investigating agency
presumably rests with the director of the prison system. He could ap-
parently appoint either a continuing body to review all complaints or
appoint reviewers on an ad hoe basis. It seems unwise to permit
the director to pick and choose the investigating agency he wants, espe-
cially when he can take into account the result he got last time. It
may be better, if only in appearance, to have the investigator ap-
pointed by the governor or the attorney general. It may also be better
to have a permanent agency in order to encourage development of com-
petency and expertise.
This kind of agency is no substitute for administrative and judicial
review. The Model Act provides authority only to issue a report to
both the department and the prisoner. The agency has no power to
implement any conclusions it may reach. Its value must lie in the ac-
ceptance of its findings by prison administrators, other governmental
authorities, prisoners, and the public. Its most substantial contribu-
157. MODEL AcT § 5.
158. See Note, The Administration of Complaints by Civilians Against the Police,
77 HARv. L. REv. 499 (1964).
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tion may well be in facilitating agreed-upon solutions to particular
problems before positions become so solidified that only intervention by
higher authority can be effective. Provided not too much is expected,
this innovation may prove a useful adjunct to other kinds of review.
F. Judicial Review
Section 6 establishes judicial authority to review compliance with
the Model Act and broad power to fashion appropriate remedies. In-
cluded are the injunctive powers and "any other appropriate remedy
in law or equity."' 5 9 In addition, a court may prohibit further com-
mitments to the institution and, in instances of "extensive and per-
sistent" abuses, may order the institution closed after a stay of six
months. 6  These powers certainly seem adequate to the task at hand.
Doubtlessly, judicial interpretation of the various provisions would do
much to add specific meaning to the Model Act's general principles
and in this way help to confine the broad discretionary powers retained
by administrators. When legislation is general in nature, a case-by-
case explanation of its meaning can add the detail needed to make it
effective. And I think it is preferable that this development of case
law occur in the context of construing legislation rather than the Con-
stitution. Thus, the statutory interpretation process can work along-
side administrative rule-making to flesh out and make effective broad
legislative directives. But the courts could do even more; they could
review administrative compliance with rule-making requirements es-
tablished by the legislature. With both the legislature and the judi-
ciary pushing in the direction of more extensive rule-making, we could
anticipate the development of a very substantial body of rules adequate
to confine, structure, and check the exercise of discretionary power
within the prison itself.' 1'
II. CONCLUSION
Legislation is an essential first step in regulating the exercise of gov-
ernmental power in prisons. The discretionary power granted can be
broad or narrow, depending on the extent to which the legislature is
willing to resolve specific policy matters. Legislators, for a number of
159. MODELACT§ 6(b).
160. Id. § 6(d).
161. See DAvis 220.
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reasons, are seldom willing to go too far in providing detailed rules to
regulate agencies they have established. Still, the Model Act, given its
purpose, does not do enough to limit the discretionary power of prison
administrators.
A few of the sections of the Model Act provide admirable detail,
making the intent of the draftsmen quite clear. But many others em-
ploy language so generalized as to be meaningless. Furthermore, many
important matters are not mentioned at all-for example, the manner
in which pre-trial detainees are to be treated. It may be that the
draftsmen recognized that the more explicit the language the more
controversy, and, being practical people, preferred something that could
be enacted. The proposed legislation, however, is a model, not a uni-
form act, and therefore is not likely to be adopted wholesale by many
legislatures. As a model it should reflect the soundest views of what
is needed, from which others can borrow in fashioning their own solu-
tions. In this respect, I think it falls short.
There is room for difference of opinion concerning some of the
value choices I would incorporate into the Model Act. Arguably, it is
better to leave most of the difficult choices to administrators to resolve.
But when that is done, it is essential that efforts be made to further
confine, structure, and check the discretionary power which is granted.
The legislature can require that administrators supplement its work
by developing rules which limit available choices of action, guide the
decision-maker in choosing among those available, and provide oppor-
tunities for review of those choices. Detailed administrative rules can
do much to improve the quality of discretionary justice in prisons.
The Model Act can be improved by requiring that administrators use
their power to develop extensive rules.
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